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I. INTRODUCTION
A cacophony of cries for criminal justice reform reverberates
from a growing chorus of discouraged, disillusioned and divergent
concerns across America. Though any number of factors supplies
ample cause for unease with the current state of our criminal justice
system, extraordinarily high rates of incarceration certainly contribute
mightily to the turmoil. Hyper-criminalization challenges abound
questioning the necessity of the volumes of crime statutes demanding
enforcement. Unacceptable rates of recidivism and questionable
policing are included in the catalog of troubling dynamics, but top
billing on the list may rightfully belong to the country’s costly policies
and practices adopted to reduce the demand and eradicate the supply
of illicit drugs. Few would argue the merit of removing substances
responsible for the degree of destruction attributable to many of the
psychoactive drugs receiving attention, but the exorbitant costs of
America’s punitive plan have failed to deliver results that justify the
expense.
An examination of the merits of the efforts expended fighting
illicit drugs requires a better appreciation of the objectives and the
allocation of resources to achieve those objectives. Reaching a sound
understanding requires realistic and rational analysis of the costs –
fiscal costs, certainly, but also sacrifices exacted from the constitution,
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demands placed on public and private institutions, and the prices
associated with less quantifiable measures. An accurate accounting of
the costs of the “war on drugs” must then necessarily include all of the
collateral damage, arguably as the most costly, the caustic erosion of
the cornerstones of U.S. democracy. The court cases resulting from this
engagement have significantly diminished our civil liberties by
shrinking the Bill of Rights, methodically abridging many freedoms we
have previously fought so fervently to preserve – freedom of religion,
freedom of speech, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures,
and property rights. Perhaps, the only fact more staggering than the
total overhead demanded by the fight against drugs is the balance
sheet’s telling of our nation’s epic failure.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a high-level survey of
our nation’s prohibition policies within the context of the costs of the
law enforcement efforts upholding those policies. The discussion will
offer a cursory review of the economic expense of the war on drugs
with tangential coverage of the constitutional, institutional and
intangible expenses that are inseparable from an assessment of the
costs of America’s drug control efforts. Part I provides a historical
review of illicit drug use in the United States, while Part II supplies the
evolution of the country’s efforts to codify its drug control policies.
Finally, Part III contains a survey of the costs of the current war on
drugs.

II. BACKGROUND
Archaeological evidence collected all over the world chronicles
human’s proclivities for the use of psychoactive substances known to
engender altered states of consciousness. 1 It is believed that over
12,000 years ago homo sapiens from the Stone Age ingested
hallucinogenic mushrooms. 2 Lake-dwellers in Switzerland more than
4,500 years ago provide the first evidence of the domestication and

Daniel Kunitz, On Drugs: Gateways to Gnosis, or Bags of Glue? HARPER’S
MAGAZINE, Oct. 2001, at 92. “All the vegetables sedatives and narcotics, all
the euphorics that grow on trees, the hallucinogens that ripen in berries or
can be squeezed from roots – all, without exception, have been know and
systematically used by human beings from time immemorial.” Id.
2 TERENCE MCKENNA, FOOD OF THE GODS: THE SEARCH FOR THE ORIGINAL TREE
OF KNOWLEDGE 47 (1992).
1

119

120

4 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2017)

consumption of poppy seeds. 3 During this same time period in China
and Neolithic Europe, there are indications of the cultivation of
cannabis or hemp. 4
Before the lake-dwellers or the Chinese and the Neolithic
Europeans, lore from India in the Brahmin tradition recognized the
intoxicating properties of cannabis and heralded the plant for granting
long life and sexual prowess. 5 Similarly, use of coca and other
stimulants by the inhabitants on the continent of South America has
been traced to primordial times. 6 The Bronze Age witnessed the
expansive use of opium as a painkiller, particularly by women to ease
the pains of childbirth and by others to relieve the discomforts of
sickness and disease. 7 In 300 B.C., Theophrastus, a Greek naturalist and
philosopher who was also a student of Aristotle and a successor to
Plato, authored the earliest undisputed reference to the use of poppy
juice. 8
Our ancient predecessors partook of psychoactive plants and
plant by-products to alter consciousness, certainly, but also for treating
pain, for communing with the gods, and for survival. 9 These plants,
often rich in alkaloids, served additionally as a source of nutrition and
RICHARD RUDGLEY, ESSENTIAL SUBSTANCES: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF
INTOXICANTS IN SOCIETY 24-26 (1993); Ashley Montagu, The Long Search for
Euphoria, 1 REFLECTIONS 1, 62-69 (1966).
4 Id. at 29.
5 ANTONIO ESCOHOTADO, A BRIEF HISTORY OF DRUGS: FROM THE STONE AGE TO
THE STONED AGE 9 (1996).
6 RICHARD DAVENPORT-HINES, THE PURSUIT OF OBLIVION: A GLOBAL HISTORY
OF NARCOTICS 26 (2002).
7 (2300 B.C. - 500 B.C.). See, e.g., R. GORDON WASSON, THE WONDROUS
MUSHROOM: MYCOLATRY IN MESOAMERICA (1980); R. GORDON WASSON,
ALBERT HOFFMANN AND CARL A. P. RUCK, THE ROAD TO ELEUSIS (1978); PETER
T. FURST, ED., FLESH OF THE GODS: THE RITUAL USE OF HALLUCINOGENS (1976).
8 Svend Norn, Poul R. Kruse & Edith Kruse, History of Opium Poppy and
Morphine, 33 DANSK MEDICINHISTORISK ARBOG 171, 174 (2004). In the 2nd
Century, Theophrastus includes in his Historia Plantarum descriptions of
different poppy varieties and methods for extracting “latex.” F.J. CarodArtal, Psychoactive Plants in Ancient Greece, 1 NEUROSCIENCES AND HIST. 28, 31
(2013). Theophrastus’s use of latex from the poppy refers to opium, using the
term mekonio to specifically designate the juice. Id. His descriptions include
opium’s medicinal uses. Id. See also, Halil Tekiner & Muberra Kosar, The
Opum Poppy as a Symbol of Sleep in Bertel Thorvaldsen’s Relief of 1815, 19 SLEEP
MEDICINE 123, 123-25 (2016), and John Scarborough, Theophrastus on Herbals
and Herbal Remedies, 11 J. OF THE HIST. OF BIOLOGY 353, 353-385 (1978).
9 Abbie Thomas, Survivial of the Druggies, NEW SCIENTIST, Mar. 30, 2002, at 11.
3
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energy. 10 It is, however, the ancient attraction to intoxicating fruits,
berries, roots and other plants that is cited as support for the
proposition that intoxication may be a universal human need, the
“fourth drive.” 11
Akin to the consumption of psychoactive substances across the
globe, drugs have been part of America’s story even before it was a
country. Native Americans introduced early settlers to tobacco, a crop
that eventually financed America’s development as a nation. 12
European and Asian settlers brought other products—coffee, tea,
alcohol, hemp and the opiates—to America. 13 Until the late 19th
century, Americans were largely indifferent to the consumption of
these drugs, which were then used legally and with very little
government interference. 14
The turn of the 20th century would witness growing concerns
about drug use in America.
Interestingly, concerns were
compartmentalized to some degree and divided by a drug’s specific
association with a vulnerable subgroup of American society. For
instance, opium use was associated with the Chinese and a rising
Chinese immigrant population on the West Coast. Concerns about
cocaine grew from the drug’s association with the “Negro” population,
particularly in the South. Alcohol use was associated with urban
Catholic immigrants, while the abuses of heroin were attributed to the

Id.
RONALD K. SEIGEL, INTOXICATION: LIFE IN PURSUIT OF ARTIFICIAL PARADISE
10 (1989); see generally, ANDREW WEIL, THE NATURAL MIND: A NEW WAY OF
LOOKING AT DRUGS AND THE HIGHER CONSCIOUSNESS (1972); and HELEN
PHILLIPS & GRAHAM LAWTON, THE INTOXICATION INSTINCT (2004).
12 See, e.g., IAIN GATELY, TOBACCO: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF HOW AN EXOTIC
PLANT SEDUCED CIVILIZATION (2001).
13 KING COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION, DRUGS AND THE DRUG LAWS: HISTORICAL
AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS 6 (2005).
14 The National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse reported to
Congress in 1973, "[d]rug policy as we know it today is a creature of the 20th
Century. Until the last third of the 19th Century, America's total legal policy
regarding drugs was limited to regulation of alcohol distribution, localized
restrictions on tobacco smoking, and the laws of the various states regulating
pharmacies and restricting the distribution of ‘poisons.’” KING COUNTY BAR
ASSOCIATION, DRUGS AND THE DRUG LAWS: HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL
CONTEXTS 6 (2005) (quoting DRUG USE IN AMERICA: PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE,
SECOND REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIJUANA AND DRUG
ABUSE 14 (1973)).
10
11
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urban immigrants. Concerns of marijuana use and the spread of its
popularity were associated with Mexican immigrants.

CHINESE OPIUM AND THE “YELLOW PERIL”
The Civil War was a marker for great change in the United
States, including what some consider the beginning of the march
toward the country’s criminalization of drugs. 15 It was the use of
morphine, an opium derivative, during the war that solidified the
support of the medical community for the drug. 16 American’s use of
opiates expanded with the spread of patent medicines containing
opium, the invention of the hypodermic syringe, and the broad
acceptance of opium derivatives, such as morphine and heroin. 17
Doctors frequently recommended opium, legal and widely available,
as a treatment for any number of ailments, and in particular, physicians
favored opium as a remedy for “female troubles” related to menstrual
and menopausal conditions. 18
By the Civil War, morphine had received broad acceptance in medical
practice. See, EDWARD M. BRECHER & THE EDITORS OF CONSUMER REPORTS
MAGAZINE, LICIT AND ILLICIT DRUGS. THE CONSUMERS UNION REPORT ON
NARCOTICS, STIMULANTS, DEPRESSANTS, INHALANTS, HALLUCINOGENS, AND
MARIJUANA – INCLUDING CAFFEINE, NICOTINE, AND ALCOHOL 3 (1972).
Morphine derives from opium and was first discovered in 1804 by German
chemist Friedrich Wilhelm Adam Serturner, responsible for isolating
morphine. THOMAS SZASZ, CEREMONIAL CHEMISTRY 189 (1974). By 1826, the
Merck Company was producing substantial quantities of the drug. Id.
16 Id.
17 Heroin is a byproduct of morphine after it is subjected to chemical
processing, first discovered in 1874. David T. Courtwright, The Roads to H:
The Emergence of the American Heroin Complex, 1889-1956, ONE HUNDRED
YEARS OF HEROIN 3 (David F. Musto, ed., 2002). Bayer Pharmaceuticals
secured heroin’s popularity when it introduced it in 1898 as “The Sedative
for Coughs.” Id. Heroin was also used as a cure for morphine dependency
and to relieve symptoms of morphine withdrawal. Id. Its greatest medical
demand, however, was in the treatment of patients suffering from
tuberculosis, pneumonia and other common respiratory conditions and was
widely prescribed by physicians into the 1920s. Id.
18 BRECHER, ET. AL, supra note 14, at 1. Many cure-alls and elixirs legally
contained opium, frequently in the form of morphine, an opium derivative,
though the pharmacological mixes were not required to disclose their
15
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Large numbers of Chinese also began immigrating to America
and accepting low paying jobs, primarily in mines and building
railroads, in search of better lives not only for themselves but also for
their families. With large populations of Chinese settling on America’s
west coast, businesses and the business class exploited the Chinese as
a moral scapegoat to deflect attention away from the actual causes of
California’s economic depression in the 1870s. 19 The search for places
to lay blame for the poor economic conditions found traction in the
assessment of the “moral” aspects of the Chinese inhabitants, with
special attention paid to the vices of the Asian communities, not the
least of which was their proclivities for opium. 20 The result was
duplicitous in that it was, in actuality, part of a thinly veiled
discrimination program against Chinese. Anti-Chinese sentiment
intensified, Chinese exclusionary laws became commonplace and antiChinese hostility toward Chinese workers escalated. 21 By 1890, racism
toward the Chinese was rampant, driving the proliferation of negative
public sentiment concerning opium.
The Chinese brought with them to America the practice of
smoking opium. 22 Although opium was commonly used in the United

ingredients. Id. The popular patent medicines rarely contained labels
identifying their contents. Id. As a result, an unsuspecting population
became accidental addicts, finding themselves addicted to the opium in the
cure-alls and elixirs. Id. The addict population consisted largely of middle
and upper class white middle-aged women. Id.
19 Patricia A. Morgan, The Legislation of Drug Law: Economic Crisis and Social
Control, 8 J. OF DRUG ISSUES 56, n.1 (1978). President Rutherford B. Hayes
signed the Chinese Exclusion Treaty in 1880, effectively reversing what had
been an open-door policy set in 1868. The new law placed strict limits on the
number of Chinese immigrants allowed into the U.S. and the number of
Chinese allowed to become naturalized citizens. Two years later, Congress
passed the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, barring immigration from China
and prohibiting the naturalization of Chinese immigrants already in the
United States for a period of 10 years. The exclusionary treaty and act
represent the federal government’s reaction to the public’s belief that lowpaid Chinese workers were taking needed jobs away from whites,
particularly during a period of economic downturn, to the public outrage of
influence the Chinese smoking parlors had over the white population, and to
an increase in anti-Chinese violence. Id. 56-58.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 The British actually introduced opium to the Chinese. After the Chinese
outlawed opium in the late 1700s, the British maintained their lucrative
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States and was popular among all classes and races, ingestion of the
drug by smoking was a distinctly Chinese practice. 23 As long as the
attraction was limited to adventurous young men, the American public
voiced little objection, but when white women fell to the temptations
of the Chinese opium smoking parlors, Chinese opium sparked public
ire. Thus, the smoking of opium quickly became one of the most
identifiable Chinese vices and is the reported trigger for the rise of the
“yellow menace.” 24 Opium and the Chinese smoking dens were
synonymous with the corruption of American values and female
chastity. 25 They also provided a tantalizing explanation for the social
problems of the day, emerging as a target for public antipathy and
legislative attention. 26
Early laws addressing opium addiction varied in their effects,
but were consistent in their origins – products of local legislation – and
smuggling trade and began what became known as the Opium Wars.
Eventually, China fell to the pressure to re-legalize the opium trade.
23 See, RICHARD DAVENPORT-HINES, THE PURSUIT OF OBLIVION: A GLOBAL
HISTORY OF NARCOTICS 46 (2002). The Chinese habit of smoking opium grew
from the marketing efforts of British smugglers who maintained a lucrative
trade bringing opium to China from England after China outlawed the
substance in the late 1700’s. Id. The Chinese ban punished keepers of opium
shops with strangulation but was designed to influence a great deal more. Id.
China hoped to discourage its citizens from comingling with the “barbaric”
Europeans, responsible for supplying the drug, and to protect the Chinese
economy be curtailing the exporting of China’s silver, which was being
traded for opium. Id.
24 Patricia A. Morgan, The Legislation of Drug Law: Economic Crisis and Social
Control, 8 J. OF DRUG ISSUES 58 (1978). William Randolph Hearst, the
infamous newspaper publisher, began publishing a series of articles detailing
how Chinese men seduced white women with the drug opium, leading them
“to ‘contaminate’ themselves by frequenting the dens in Chinatown.” Id.; see
also, Stanford M. Lyman, The “Yellow Peril” Mystique: Origins and Vicissitudes
of a Racist Discourse, 13 INT’L J. OF POL., CULTURE AND SOC’Y 683 (2000).
25 The San Francisco Police Department reported that while officers were
visiting these opium dens they “found white women and Chinamen side by
side under the effects of this drug – a humiliating site to anyone who has
anything left of manhood.” S. COMM., Chinese Immigration, It’s Social, Moral
and Political Effects (testimony of the San Francisco Police Department) (Ca.
1878). During the same period, the San Francisco Post published articles
opposing the Chinese for having “impoverished our country, degraded our
free labor and hoodlumized our children. [The Chinaman] is now
destroying our young men with opium.” Id.
26 Morgan, supra note 23, at 56.
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in their purpose – eradication of the socializing of whites, specifically
white women, with the Chinese. 27 In some instances, city ordinances
prohibited Chinese from using opium but permitted use by white
people. 28 In other instances, local legislation allowed the continued use
of the drug by Chinese, but outlawed its use by whites. 29

“NEGRO” COCAINE AND THE “SOUTHERN MENACE”
As the opium epidemic engulfed America’s west, cocaine
amassed its attack on the South. Not unlike the Chinese immigrant
laborers on the West Coast, in the late 1800’s, southern black laborers
found cocaine to be of assistance for increasing endurance and
withstanding strenuous working conditions. By the turn of the 20th
century, poor black laborers were developing habits for the drug and
found sniffing or snorting cocaine to be the quickest and cheapest way
to reap what was believed to be the drug’s benefits. 30 Similar to the
Chinese immigrants’ association to opium, the poor black laborers of
the South became firmly linked to cocaine in the minds of the American
public, but contrary to public perception, the predominant users of
cocaine in the early 1900’s were not the black laborers in the South. 31
The drug was far more popular, in fact, with whites and especially with
the white criminal element consisting of prostitutes, pimps, gamblers
and other “urban hoodlums.” 32
Notwithstanding the drug’s popularity with the whites, the
media provided significant aid in anchoring the public’s association of
blacks and cocaine and in stoking the racial tensions that already
existed between the blacks and the whites. Another parallel between
opium and cocaine at the turn of the last century was the media’s
Id. at 56-58; Joseph D. McNamara, The Hidden Costs of America’s War on
Drugs, 26 J. OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 97, 98-99 (2011).
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 CHARLES E. DE M. SAJOUS, ANALYTICAL CYCLOPAEDIA OF PRACTICAL
MEDICINE, III 506 (1902). Cocaine’s popularity was certainly not limited to
southern black laborers. Id. The act of snorting cocaine distinguished the
use by common people from the use by the upper and professional class
users who preferred injecting it with a syringe. Id. Cocaine’s “assistance”
was so apparent that some employers, including plantation owners,
provided the drug to their black workers to improve productivity and
control the laborers. DAVENPORT-HINES, supra note 22, at 200.
31 DAVENPORT-HINES, supra note 22, at 200.
32 Id.
27
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sensationalizing the drug’s use and its abuses, which the newspapers
promptly connected to a marginalized subset of American society. The
press fed the whites’ fears by publishing shocking fabrications of
“cocaine crazed Negro[es]” leaving their farms and job sites on sexual
rampages attacking and having their way with white women,
reminiscent of the goings on in the Chinese smoking parlors. 33

MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS AND THE MARIJUANA MENACE

As the 20th century progressed, a new drug threatened the
country. Immigrants moving north from Mexico, in search of the
American Dream, brought with them cannabis, which they called
marijuana. 34 Although hemp and cannabis were not new to the United
States, it was the combined effect of prohibition and the expansive
prevalence of the recreational use of marijuana by Mexican immigrants
and Mexican-Americans that brought cannabis to the forefront in the
1920s. 35
By the 1930s, marijuana’s popularity had spread throughout the
country from schoolyards to neighborhood bridge parties. 36 In fact,
33 “Most of the attacks upon white women of the South are the direct result
of the cocaine crazed Negro brain . . . Negro cocaine fiends are now a known
Southern menace.” Dr. Edward H. Williams, Negro Cocaine “Fiends” Are A
New Southern Menace, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1914, at IV-12. Superhuman
strength provided another legend attributable to the blacks’ use of cocaine
and led southern law enforcement to transition from .32 to .38 caliber
revolvers because cocaine-frenzied blacks were impervious to the smaller
rounds. See, MUSTO, supra note 16, at 7 (1999). Harry Anslinger, the head of
the predecessor to the Drug Enforcement Agency, advocated for harsher
penalties related to cocaine use and possession by recounting stories of
racially mixed groups dancing together at nightclubs while under the
influence of cocaine. See, HARRY SHAPIRO, WAITING FOR THE MAN: THE STORY
OF DRUGS AND POPULAR MUSIC (1999).
34 RONALD K. SEIGEL, INTOXICATION: LIFE IN PURSUIT OF ARTIFICIAL PARADISE
273 (1989). America’s prohibition of alcohol in the 1920’s kindled an
increased use of marijuana. Id.
35 BRECHER, ET. AL, supra note 14.
36 WILLIAM O. WALKER, III, DRUG CONTROL IN THE AMERICAS 102 (1981).
In New Orleans, the reporters in 1926 laid particular stress on
the smoking of marijuana by children. "It was definitely
ascertained that school children of 44 schools (only a few of
these were high schools) were smoking 'mootas.'
Verifications came in by the hundreds from harassed parents,
teachers, neighborhood pastors, priests, welfare workers and
club women . . . The Waif's Home, at this time, was reputedly
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marijuana “tea pads,” first surfacing in New Orleans and other
southern port cities, had infiltrated most major cities in the United
States by 1930. 37 The marijuana pads “resembled opium dens or
speakeasies except that prices were very low; a man could get high for
a quarter on marijuana smoked in the pad, or for even less if he bought
the marijuana at the door and took it away to smoke.” 38
Not unlike the associations ascribed to opium and to cocaine
before it, it was marijuana’s association with Hispanics that attracted
negative public attention and opposition. 39 The white majority’s bias
against anyone not its own now also enveloped Mexicans. The white’s
intolerance intensified as competition for jobs grew fiercer while the
“roaring twenties” fell to the Great Depression. Again, paralleling the
Chinese earlier in the century, the Mexican immigrants became an
intentional scapegoat for rising unemployment rates in the 1930s and
for other social ailments as the country’s economic depression
continued to bear down on its inhabitants. 40
The public’s indifference and the government’s abeyance
concerning psychoactive drugs would not continue. Fear, economic
pressures, sensational media reports and an epidemic of addiction
joined to create a force demanding a response.

full of children, both white and colored, who had been
brought in under the influence of the drug. Marijuana
cigarettes could be bought almost as readily as sandwiches.
Their cost was two for a quarter. The children solved the
problem of cost by pooling pennies among the members of a
group and then passing the cigarettes from one to another, all
the puffs being carefully counted."
BRECHER, ET. AL, supra note 14.
37 SEIGEL, supra note 33, at 273. By 1930, New York City served as host to at
least 500 marijuana tea pads. See, Mayor's Committee on Marijuana, The
Marijuana Problem in the City of New York, THE MARIJUANA PAPERS 246 (David
Solomon, ed., 1944).
38 BRECHER, ET. AL, supra note 14.
39 MUSTO, supra note 16, at 219-20. The Federal Bureau of Narcotics
furthered public fears of marijuana by publicizing official statements about
police estimates that “fifty percent of the violent crimes committed in
districts occupied by Mexicans, Spaniards, Latin Americans, Greeks or
Negroes may be traced to this evil” of marijuana. RICHARD J. BONNIE &
CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD II, THE MARIJUANA CONVICTION 100 (1974).
40 C.M. Goethe, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1935, IV-9. “[M]arijuana, perhaps now
the most insidious of our narcotics, is a direct by-product of unrestricted
Mexican immigration . . . our nation has more than enough laborers.” Id.
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III. AMERICA’S CRIMINALIZATION OF DRUGS
The “war on drugs,” at least as we know it, recently marked its
forty-fifth anniversary, but America’s criminalization of drugs and the
escalation of drug enforcement began just over a century ago. Until the
turn of the last century, the federal government generally abstained
from becoming involved in drug control efforts. Prior to that, the 19th
century witnessed state and local governments promulgating the
earliest laws addressing drugs; there were no national drug control
policies. The laws the states and local governments enacted were quite
mild in their restrictions, and most placed the onus of policing drugs’
distribution on the health professions. 41 Blanket prohibitions on any
drug were rare.
Early national legislative attention centered primarily on
opium. Congress increased the import tariff on smoking opium in 1883,
but left unaffected opium imported for other purposes. 42 In 1887,
Congress barred the importation of opium by any subject of China, but
it did not prohibit importing opium by non-Chinese concerns, nor did
it restrict importation of opium from Canada. 43 Then, in 1890,
Congress passed legislation that limited the manufacture of smoking
opium to American citizens. 44

THE PURE FOOD AND DRUG ACT
In 1906, however, the federal government responded to the
growing opium and cocaine epidemics with a new approach. By
enacting the Pure Food and Drugs Act, 45 Congress stepped into the
realm of public health and safety, an area formerly exclusively held by
state governments. The legislation did not prohibit the use of opium,
cocaine or any other substance but rather, required all physicians to
accurately label medicines to ensure the doctors disclosed the identities
and quantities of the medicines’ contents and ingredients to all

Second Report of the National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse,
Drug Use in America: Problem in Perspective 14 (1973).
42 CHARLES E. TERRY & MILDRED PELLENS, THE OPIUM PROBLEM 747 (1928).
43 ALEXANDER T. SHULGIN, CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES: A CHEMICAL AND
LEGAL GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL DRUG LAWS 244 (1988).
44 BRECHER ET. AL, supra note 14, at 44.
45 Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 768. It was also known as the
Wiley Act.
41
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potential users. 46 Additionally, Congress required appropriate notices
be included if the medicines contained any dangerous or habit-forming
ingredients. 47
Despite the success of the Pure Food and Drug Act in reducing
opiate addiction, Congress passed the Opium Exclusion Act48 in 1909,
the nation’s first federal drug prohibition law. The legislation affected
a national ban on imported, non-medicinal smoking opium, and
marked the success of the concerted efforts of the U.S. Secretary of State
Elihu Root, Dr. Hamilton Wright and others to enact national opium
prohibitions in advance of President Roosevelt’s Conference of the
International Opium Commission in Shanghai in 1909. 49
Dr. Wright was intent, however, on even greater, more widely
sweeping legislation. Upon his return from the Shanghai conference,
he drafted legislation entitled the Foster Antinarcotics Bill. 50 The
legislation was founded on Congress’ constitutionally granted taxing
power and provided for a federal tax on all drug transactions. 51 It also
required everyone who sold drugs to register with the government and
record all drug sales. 52 Unfortunately for Dr. Wright and others who
backed the legislation, the popular support did not outweigh the
nation’s drug manufacturers and retailers who opposed the bill, and
the legislation failed, never coming to a vote. 53
Id. It did not take long for the new act to debunk the belief that the vast
majority of addicts consisted of accidental addicts. It was soon discovered
that many opium addicts genuinely sought out the drug solely for its
psychoactive effects.
47 Id.
48 Smoking Opium Exclusion Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 614.
49 Id. It was a proposal drafted by Dr. Hamilton Wright, the U.S. State
Department’s appointee to the American delegation to the Conference of the
International Opium Commission. Dr. Wright advocated strongly that the
U.S. serve as a model for other nations by enacting its own exemplary opium
laws. MUSTO, supra note 16, at 33. [1999] At the time, America had no legal
ban limiting the use, sale, or manufacture of products containing opium or
coca. Id.
50 H.R. 25241, 61st Cong. (1910); see also, Hamilton Wright, Report on the
International Opium Commission and on the Opium Problem as Seen within the
United States and Its Possessions, OPIUM PROBLEM: MESSAGE FROM THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, S. DOC. NO. 377 at 45 (1910).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 The Foster Antinarcotics Bill included cumbersome record-keeping and
reporting requirements opposed by business and industry. MUSTO, supra
note 16, at 47-48. [1999]
46
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THE HARRISON NARCOTICS TAX ACT: “ . . . A ROUTINE SLAP AT
MORAL EVIL” 54
Dr. Wright was undaunted in his efforts to acquire
prohibitionist legislation despite the earlier failure of the Foster
Antinarcotics Bill. During the next session of Congress, he, the other
physicians who participated in the drafting of the legislation and other
supporters succeeded in having the domestic drug prohibition
legislation introduced into the House of Representatives. 55 Opposition
from business and industry, including the American Medical
Association (AMA), remained ardent, but grudging compromises
resulted in the Harrison Act being signed into law on December 17,
1914. 56
The new law required drug manufacturers and sellers to
register their activity with the federal government, to keep records of
their sales, and to pay taxes on each transaction. 57 For the medical
community, the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act provided a legal
mechanism to ensure that those responsible for selling and dispensing
addictive drugs, drugs such as opium and its derivatives – morphine
and heroin, cocaine and others, did so in an orderly fashion, whether
the amount distributed was smaller in quantities sold over the counter
or was larger and required a physician’s prescription. 58 Physicians and
pharmacists had participated in drafting the statute, and they felt
protected by its language, particularly the language shielding them
from government interference in their practices. 59
MUSTO, supra note 16, at 65. [1999]
MUSTO, infra note 66. [1972]
56 36 Stat. 785-90 (1914). The official title of the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act
was the following: “An Act to provide for the registration of, with collectors
of internal revenue and to impose a special tax upon all persons who
produce, import, manufacture, compound, deal in, dispense, sell, distribute,
or give away opium or coca leaves, their salts, derivatives or preparations,
and for other purposes.” Id.
57 Id.; see also, EVA BERTRAM, MORRIS BLACHMAN, KENNETH SHARPE, & PETER
ANDREAS, DRUG WAR POLITICS: THE PRICE OF DENIAL 68 (1996).
58 BRECHER, ET. AL, supra note 14, at 48.
59 The Harrison Act included, “Nothing contained in this section shall apply
to the dispensing or distribution of any of the aforesaid drugs to a patient by
a physician, dentist, or veterinary surgeon registered under this Act in the
course of his professional practice only.” Harrison Narcotic Act of 1914, Pub.
L. No. 223, 36 Stat. 785, 789.
54
55
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Little did they know that in only a few short years, the Harrison
Narcotic Act would transform from a relatively innocuous revenue
measure into a powerful tool for federal authorities to regulate, and
ultimately prohibit, a wide range of narcotics-related activities.
Further, instead of enjoying protection of the language of the Harrison
Act, physicians and pharmacists would soon learn that the language
they believed provided them security would be language used against
them. Ultimately the language in question, the wording that shielded
them from government interference “in their practices,” was deemed
to be language subject to multiple interpretations.
Some
interpretations supplied undercover Treasury agents the authority to
arrest thousands of doctors and pharmacists for prescribing and
administering drugs to narcotics addicts. 60 In the 1920s, the Treasury
Department charged and prosecuted more than 25,000 doctors for
alleged Harrison Act violations, and over 3,000 of those charged served
sentences in the penitentiary. 61 Although contentious legal issues
arose, the Court rejected the Treasury Department’s attempts to use the
Harrison Act as a prohibition against physicians and their patients. 62
60 DAVENPORT-HINES, supra note 22, at 230. The U.S. Treasury Department
took advantage of the ambiguous language “in pursuit of their professional
practice” and instigated initiatives to adopt regulations forbidding
physicians from providing drugs for addiction maintenance in cases where
addiction was unrelated to medical issues. “The manifest lack of federal
power to regulate medical practice as well as the need to unify professional
support of the Harrison Act may have required these vague phrases.”
MUSTO, supra note 16, at 125 (1999).
61 LAWRENCE KOLB, DRUG ADDITION: A MEDICAL PROBLEM 145-46 (1962).
62 United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394 (1916), provided the first major
legal challenge to the constitutionality of the Harrison Narcotic Act. Id. In
its decision the Supreme Court limited the scope of the statute denying the
U.S. Treasury Department’s attempt to prosecute a doctor for prescribing
drugs to an addict and the Treasury Department’s efforts to criminalize the
addict’s possession of an illicit drug prescribed by his doctor. Id. at 401. The
Court recognized that an act of Congress is only valid if carried out pursuant
to an expressly granted constitutional power and, in so doing, held that the
Harrison Act was not required under international treaty as had been
promoted. Id. at 401. Therefore, where the Act was passed under Congress’
taxing power, it could only be valid for raising revenue. Id. The Court then
found that both preventing a doctor from exercising professional judgment
to prescribe drugs and prohibiting mere possession of drugs were actions
unrelated to revenue collection, and the federal government could not use
the Harrison Act to prosecute doctors who prescribed drugs or to prosecute
the individuals who possess the drugs. Id.
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The victory enjoyed by doctors and pharmacists would prove to be
short-lived. 63
Notwithstanding the decision in Jin Fuey Moy, the Treasury Department
refused to abandon its attempts to regulate the prescription practices of
physicians and pharmacists. Rather, it continued its efforts under the pretext
of conducting “tax” law enforcement in a fashion it argued was consistent
with the language of the Harrison Act and the Court’s interpretation in Jin
Fuey Moy. In United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919), and Webb v. United
States, 249 U.S. 96 (1919), two companion cases whose decisions the Supreme
Court delivered on the same day, the Court explicitly upheld the statute as a
legitimate revenue measure in Doremus, writing,
[i]f the legislation enacted has some reasonable relation to the
exercise of the taxing authority conferred by the Constitution,
if cannot be invalidated because of the supposed motives
which induced it....The act may not be declared
unconstitutional because its effect may be to accomplish
another purpose as well as the raising of revenue.

63

249 U.S. at 93-94. In the Webb decision, the Court went further
holding that the legitimate practice of medicine could not include
prescribing drugs to patients simply to maintain their addiction with
no intent to cure them. 249 U.S. at 97-98. The Treasury Department
seized on this language to justify their continued pursuit of doctors
and pharmacists.
Three years later, the Treasury Department obtained an
undeniable triumph that would consign significant and lasting
effects on America’s drug enforcement policy. In United States v.
Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922), the Supreme Court upheld the Treasury
Department’s criminalization of physicians’ prescribing drugs to
narcotics addicts whose only medical ailment was the addiction,
affirming the federal government’s position that providing a
narcotics prescription to an addict was a de facto criminal act,
regardless of the physician’s intent or “good faith.” Id. at 289. The
effects of the Behrman decision would not be undone by the Court’s
subsequent decision in Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5 (1925). In
Linder, the Court reversed course recognizing constitutional issues
with the Harrison Act if in expanding the statute’s meaning beyond
its taxing authority the Court’s interpretation was correct. Id. at 2123. The Court’s decision recognized that there could be medically
appropriate justifications for prescribing narcotics to an addict “to
relieve conditions incident to addition.” Id. at 22. By 1925, however,
the government’s punitive enforcement practices were so firmly
entrenched that “few were willing to challenge Treasury’s actions
politically or in court, and the ruling had little real impact.”
BERTRAM, ET. AL, supra note 56, at 75.
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THE MARIJUANA TAX ACT OF 1937
The next major piece of legislation in the criminalization of
drugs in America was legislation proposed by Narcotics Commissioner
Harry J. Anslinger and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 64 Proponents
sought to bring marijuana under federal control, but they needed a way
to do so without running afoul of the Constitution. Relying, again, on
Congress’ authority to tax presented the solution.
To garner popular support, Anslinger looked to the power of
the press. Working through the media, Anslinger perpetuated the
public’s fear of drugs by arguing that the use of marijuana caused
insanity and led to violent crime.65 The Senate followed Anslinger’s
lead and issued a report to accompany the bill, describing marijuana’s
threats in the following way:
[u]nder the influence of this drug marijuana the will is
destroyed and all power of directing and controlling
thought is lost. Inhibitions are released. As a result of
these effects, many violent crimes have been committed
under the influence of this drug…. [M]arijuana is being
placed in the hands of high school children…. by
unscrupulous peddlers. Its continued use results many
times in impotency and insanity. 66
Though there was opposition, particularly from the American
Medical Association, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the
Congress established the Federal Bureau of Narcotics as a division of the
U.S. Treasury Department in 1930, and Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon
appointed his nephew-in-law Harry J. Anslinger as the bureau’s first
commissioner. SHULGIN, supra note 42, at 245. Anslinger would become one
of the most influential and prominent figures in the history of America’s
criminalization of drugs. Id. He would become one of the most influential
individuals in America’s criminalization of drugs and would later earn
notoriety as the “father of the drug war.” See, John C. McWilliams, Unsung
Partner Against Crime: Harry J. Anslinger and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
1930-1962, 113 PENN. MAG. OF HIST. AND BIOGRAPHY 207, 207-236 (1989).
65 “How many murders, suicides, robberies, criminal assaults, hold-ups,
burglaries, and deeds of maniacal insanity it [marijuana] causes each year,
especially among the young, can only be conjectured.” JOHN KAPLAN,
MARIJUANA, THE NEW PROHIBITION 92 (1971) (quoting Commissioner Harry J.
Anslinger); see also, NORMAN E. ZINBERG & JOHN A. ROBERTSON, DRUGS AND
THE PUBLIC 178 (1969).
66 Id. at 178-79 (quoting the U.S. Senate report accompanying the proposed
Marijuana Tax Act of 1937).
64
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Marijuana Tax Act into law on October 1, 1937. 67 The statute imposed
a tax on all marijuana imported, sold, or otherwise handled by placing
a transfer tax on each transaction involving the substance. 68
Additionally, though the new legislation did not actually prohibit the
sale or possession of marijuana, it did require anyone handling
cannabis to register with the federal government. 69 If one failed to
register, to pay the required taxes and to acquire the mandated transfer
stamp, he was subject to fines commanding substantial payments and
incarceration carrying sentences up to twenty years. 70

THE BOGGS ACT OF 1951
The Boggs Act of 1951 71 established the country’s first
mandatory minimum sentences for drug-related offenses. 72 The
legislation was in response to the concerns of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics over the rise in illicit drug use following World War II. 73
During wartime, the United States experienced a decline in drug use, a
decline attributable to a variety of factors. 74 One factor, a shortage of
supply through medical channels, fostered the need for alternative
sources for the drugs’ supply and unwittingly cultivated a black
market demand. 75 As the drug supply steadily diminished, the street
price of the drugs continued to rise, attracting even greater numbers of
criminal enterprises. 76 In addition to creating mandatory minimum
sentences for drug violations, and in part, to address the increased
67 Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 551; see also, David F. Musto, The
Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, 26 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 101, 101-08
(1972).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Boggs Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 255, 65 Stat. 767.
72 WALKER, supra note 35, at 170-71.
73 Harry J. Anslinger, The Federal Narcotic Laws, 6 FOOD, DRUG, AND COSM. L. J.
743, 743-48 (1951).
74 WALKER, supra note 35, at 170-71.
75 DANIEL GLASER, Interlocking Dualities in Drug Use, Drug Control and Crime,
DRUGS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 46 (James A. Inciardi & Carl D.
Chambers, eds. 1974).
76 Id.
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numbers of black market drug dealers, the Boggs Act modified the
prior penalties associated with Harrison Act violations increasing them
fourfold. 77

THE NARCOTIC CONTROL ACT OF 1956
The American Medical Association and the American Bar
Association (ABA), troubled by the federal government’s punitive
drug policies, joined forces to persuade a congressional subcommittee
to reexamine the country’s drug dilemma, the degree to which narcotic
drugs were an issue, and the efficacy of the drug laws in place. 78 The
double-team effort succeeded in persuading Senator Price Daniel of
Texas to hold hearings across the country to study America’s approach
to the drug problem. 79
Daniel’s committee concluded in 1956 and reported finding a
severe drug problem requiring drastic punitive measures. 80 The
committee “accused the Supreme Court of permitting major dope
traffickers to escape trial by its too-liberal interpretation of
constitutional safeguards; it found the Narcotics Bureau could not fight
the traffic effectively without being freed to tap telephones; the
allowance of bail in narcotics cases was intensifying the flow of drugs
into the country; and Bureau agents ought to have statutory authority
to carry weapons.” 81 Further, Daniel’s committee condemned the
concept of drug treatment clinics and demanded increased penalties
for drug offenses, including the addition of the death penalty for
smuggling and for heroin sales. 82
Regrettably, it was not what the AMA and the ABA intended
when they lobbied for reexamination of America’s drug policies, and
Daniel’s study resulted in Congress’ passage of additional, even more
repressive legislation – the Narcotic Control Act of 1956, known as the
Daniel Act. 83 The newly enacted statute eliminated suspended
sentences, probation, and parole for drug violations and, not

65 Stat. 767.
RUFUS KING, THE DRUG HANG-UP, AMERICA’S FIFTY YEAR FOLLY 14 (1972).
79 Id.; see also, WILLIAM O. WALKER III, DRUG CONTROL POLICY: ESSAYS IN
HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 19-20 (2004).
80 WALKER, supra note 78, at 19-20.
81 Id. at 16.
82 SHULGIN, supra note 42, at 246.
83 Narcotic Control Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 567.
77
78
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surprisingly, established new longer mandatory minimum sentences. 84
In addition to raising minimum sentences, the act increased both prison
terms and fines for violations of the drug laws. 85 Heeding Daniel’s
request, Congress also included a provision for imposing the death
penalty against anyone over the age of eighteen who provided heroin
to anyone under the age of eighteen. 86

THE DRUG ABUSE CONTROL ACT OF 1965
The Drug Abuse Control Act created provisions that closely
paralleled the Harrison Narcotics Act in their mandate requiring
registration, inspection, and record-keeping by all persons concerned
with any controlled substance covered under the Act and with the
trafficking of those substances. 87 Pursuant to the statute, the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) assumed responsibility for enforcement of
the addition to America’s drug policies through its newly created
Bureau of Drug Abuse Control, named for the legislation responsible
for its creation. 88 The FDA also promulgated new regulations under the
Drug Abuse Control Act establishing quotas and limiting supplies of
certain narcotics and placing severe restrictions on the manufacture a
pharmaceutical amphetamines. 89 The restrictions did little to forestall
the proliferation of users of illicit psychoactive substances but did
much to motivate the growth of a black market in "speed." 90

THE MODERN ERA OF AMERICA’S DRUG POLICIES
Until the late 1960s, the federal government’s role in drug
enforcement would have been considered minimal, and the U.S.

Id.
Id.
86 Id.; see also, ALFRED R. LINDESMITH, THE ADDICT AND THE LAW 26 (1965).
87 KING, supra note 77, at 26.
88 Drug Abuse Control Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 226.
89 Id.
90 The supply shortages created by the statute’s restrictions in turn sparked
an escalation in pricing of the black market drugs sufficient enough to make
the street’s profit potential attractive to new criminal organizations, a veteran
business model first developed with alcohol in the 1920s, and later repeated
with the opiates in the 1940s and 1950s. DAVENPORT-HINES, supra note 22, at
312-13.
84
85
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Department of Justice played no role at all. 91 Federal efforts consisted
predominantly of customs officials seizing what they could at the
nation’s borders, the Treasury Department's Federal Bureau of
Narcotics investigating heroin rings, and the FDA regulating
pharmaceuticals. 92 A “war on drugs” did not exist.
Richard Nixon, however, adopted controlling narcotics as a
sizable plank in his campaign platform, and Nixon’s proclamation of a
nation-wide necessity to restrict the availability, sale and use of illicit
drugs gathered increasingly greater popular accord as his campaign
progressed. 93 After his election, President Nixon unveiled a global
campaign to eradicate drugs and drug traffickers. 94 He established the
National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse in 1970 and the
Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention. 95 A year later, he
declared drugs to be “public enemy number one,” becoming the first
American president to officially declare a “war on drugs,” and setting
the stage for each executive that followed. 96

THE COMPREHENSIVE DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONTROL
ACT OF 1970
A hallmark of Nixon’s crusade against drugs was the passage
of the Controlled Substances Act as Title II of the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act. 97 In addition to wholly replacing
the Harrison Act as the nation’s chief legislative instrument of drug
control, it positioned the manufacture, importation, distribution, and
possession of certain psychoactive substances under federal authority
and regulation. 98 Congress relied on its authority to regulate interstate
commerce as the basis to subordinate all previously existing drug laws
under federal power, but an immediate effect of the legislation was to
DAN BAUM, SMOKE AND MIRRORS: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND THE POLITICS OF
FAILURE 206-91 (1996).
92 Id.
93 MUSTO, supra note 16, at 253-57. [1988]
94 DAVENPORT-HINES, supra note 6, at 421-423.
95 Id.
96 In 1971, Nixon declared “total war . . . on all fronts against an enemy with
many faces.” See, SHULGIN, supra note 42, at 247.
97 84 Stat. 1236 (1970).
98 Id. Three years later, Congress consolidated all anti-drug activities under a
newly created Drug Enforcement Administration, further strengthening the
federal bureaucratic mechanism for drug control nurtured by the Nixon
administration. See, Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, 87 Stat. 1091.
91
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“effectively destroy the Federal-State relationship that existed between
the Harrison Act and the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act.” 99
In an effort to restore the balance between state and federal
authorities that existed prior to the passage of the Controlled
Substances Act, the Commissioner on Uniform State Laws drafted the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act. 100 It replaced the Uniform
Narcotic Drug Act of 1932, and presented an arrangement of
complementary federal and state drug control laws that soon became
the national standard for the control and legislative enforcement of
narcotic and dangerous drugs.
Another feature of the Controlled Substances Act, it introduced
five schedules or categories for drugs, arranged in descending order
based on a substance’s potential for abuse and ascending order
determined by a substance’s approved medicinal use. 101 As an
example, neither of the illicit drugs heroin and Ecstasy have any
accepted medical use, but their potential for abuse is quite high. They
both fall under Schedule I. 102 While substances that are widely
accepted medicinal drugs, like medications that treat diarrhea, fall
within Schedule V. 103
President Gerald Ford’s brief administration brought some
amount of pragmatism to Nixon’s anti-drug measures. Though
President Ford maintained pressure for stronger controls, he
acknowledged that eliminating drug abuse was an illusory exercise. 104
Shulgin, supra note 42, at 247
84 Stat. 1285 (1970); see also, Rufus King, The 1970 Act: Don’t Sit There,
Amend Something,
http://www.druglibrary.ent/special/king/dhu/dhu23.htm. (last visited X)
101 84 Stat. 1236 (1970).
102 Arthur J. Lurigio, A Century of Losing Battles: The Costly and Ill-Advised War
on Drugs in the United States (Loyola Univ. Chicago Social Justice Centers,
Loyola eCommons, Working Paper, Paper No. 21, 2014),
http://ecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=social
_justice&seiredir=1&referer=https%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.com%2Fscholar%3Fhl%3
Den%26q%3DLurigio%2Bcentury%2Bof%2Blosing%2Bbattles%26btnG%3D
%26as_sdt%3D1%252C25%26as_sdtp%3D#search=%22Lurigio%20century%
20losing%20battles%22. (last visited X)
103 Id.
104 Musto, supra note 16, at 257. [1999] The Domestic Council Drug Abuse
Task Force released its White Paper on Drug Abuse during Ford’s
administration. See, Domestic Council Drug Abuse Task Force, White Paper,
(1975),
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/LIBRARY/document/0067/1562951.
99

100
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The more pragmatic tenor of Ford’s administration also found footing
in the subsequent administration of President Jimmy Carter. President
Carter, addressing Congress, urged that “penalties against possession
of a drug should not be more damaging to an individual than the use
of the drug itself; and where they are, they should be changed.” 105
Federal law never reflected President Carter’s suggestions of
decriminalizing marijuana nor his more realistic approaches to drug
control, and any softening positions eventually dissolved.
When President Ronald Reagan took office, he brought with
him an attitude toward drug control reminiscent of the Nixon
administration. America was emerging from the Vietnam War, and the
reach of the Columbian drug cartels was international. American’s fear
of drugs experienced renewed momentum and found respite in
President Reagan’s support of a strong law enforcement approach to
drug control. 106 From the White House Rose Garden in 1982, President
Ronald Reagan declared, “[w]e can put drug abuse on the run through
stronger law enforcement, through cooperation with other nations to
stop the trafficking, and by calling on the tremendous volunteer
resources of parents, teachers, civic in religious leaders, and state and
local officials." 107 Congress’ additions to America’s drug policies
reflected the prohibitionist stance of the Reagan administration.

THE COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984
pdf. (last visited X) The Council’s white paper indicated the problem of drug
abuse was one that the government could only hope to contain, and it
warned that the government’s ability to totally eliminate drug abuse was an
unlikely prospect. Id. at 97-98.
105 Quoted in Musto, supra note 16, at 261. [1999] Carter campaigned on a
platform that included decriminalizing marijuana and repealing federal laws
that penalized people for less than one ounce of an illicit drug. See, e.g.,
MICHAEL MASSING, THE FIX (1998). – need more detailed reference
106 Id. at 266-67.
107 President Ronald Reagan, Remarks on Signing Executive Order 12368,
Concerning Federal Drug Abuse Policy Functions (June 24, 1982) (in William
Richard Files, White House Staff Files, Ronald Reagan Library),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=42671. (last visited X)
Nancy Reagan’s antidrug campaign “Just Say No” became a controversial
component of the broad national approach to the elimination of drug abuse
but was very popular with parents, schools and the media. The
administration’s fight focused on white middle-class youth and received
funding from corporate and private donations. Musto, supra note 16, at 26668. [1999]
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In 1984, the Controlled Substances Act underwent change with
a variety of additions known as the Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 1984. 108 The new amendments included provisions for placing
certain “designer drugs” into the scheduling formula and for seizing
the profits derived from criminal acts. 109

THE ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT OF 1986
By signing the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 110 , President
Reagan significantly intensified the federal government’s fight for drug
control and recognized the bipartisan support for tough new penalties
for those who violated the nation’s drug laws. The legislation
established mandatory minimum sentences for violations of heroin and
cocaine statues, and in so doing Congress created marked disparities
in legal penalties for the possession and sales of powder cocaine and
crack cocaine. 111 Congress also established the possibility of a capital
sentence for certain drug offenses. 112

THE ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT OF 1988
President Reagan’s intensification of nationwide efforts to
control illicit drugs continued with the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1988. 113 With this legislation, the Reagan administration sought
98 Stat. 1976 (1984).
Id.
110 100 Stat. 3207. The legislation received almost unanimous congressional
support, partly in reaction to the overdose death of Len Bias. Earlier that
year, Bias, a promising collegiate basketball star, died suddenly from a
suspected cocaine overdose. His death and the prominence played by illicit
drugs garnered front-page news nationwide.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 102 Stat. 4181. President Reagan was adamant about getting “tough on
drugs.” RONALD REAGAN, RADIO ADDRESS TO THE NATION ON ECONOMIC
GROWTH AND THE WAR ON DRUGS, The American Presidency Project (Oct. 8,
1988), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=34997. (last visited X)
Reagan announced that “we will no longer tolerate those who sell drugs and
those who buy drugs . . . they must pay.” Id. President Reagan’s declaration
was an outward demonstration of his having harnessed the existing public
momentum seeking a crackdown on drug use in America. By 1982, over
3,000 parents’ groups had assembled and organized under the National
108
109
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to prevent the manufacture of scheduled drugs and to further
discourage drug use by adopting even more stringent penalties. 114
Congress opined "the legalization of illegal drugs, on the Federal or
State level is unconscionable surrender in a war in which . . . there can
be no substitute for total victory . . . it is the declared policy of the
United States Government to create a drug-free America in 1995." 115
The United States would spend billions of dollars and convict
thousands of drug offenders, but the notable goal was unattainable.

THE 21ST CENTURY “WAR ON DRUGS”
Each decade of the last century witnessed ever increasing
government effort to eradicate addiction, thwart drug trafficking, and
prevent drug-related crime. The 1990s and the move into the 21st
century continued the pattern – new legislation continues, as does
unprecedented spending, increased numbers of arrests and
incarceration of drug offenders, and even longer prison sentences with
little or no rehabilitative component. The sad reality is that after
billions of dollars, millions of man-hours, and untold numbers of lives,
America’s punitive approach has wholly failed to eradicate drug
addiction, failed to thwart trafficking and failed to prevent drugrelated crime. In fact, the government’s expenditures and efforts have
failed even to reduce these numbers for any sustained period.
Success, however, has not been altogether elusive. Our nation’s
governing bodies, including the individual state governments, have
realized unparalleled accomplishments regarding a variety of drugrelated matters, though these hallmarks cannot truly be counted as
triumphs in the war on drugs. Among those accomplishments, we
have allocated and spent more money, enacted more drug-related
legislation, created thousands of new drug-related crimes, and
prosecuted and jailed more people, all with little in the way of
corresponding victories to claim as a result. The prevalence of drug
use continues, epidemics of drug abuse are spreading, the rise of
incidences of drug offenses and drug-related crimes abound, and the
toll of the public costs escalates. The hard truth is that the costs and
consequences of America’s drug policy, with its increased
Federation of Parents for Drug Free Youth. Gonzales, Laurence, The War on
Drugs: A Special Report, April PLAYBOY 134 (1982).
114 Id.
115 Shulgin, supra note 42, at 250.
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criminalization of drugs and drug-related activities, its ever-exacting
retributive sanctions and the intensified enforcement efforts have
simply failed.

IV. THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA’S WAR ON
DRUGS
America’s national policy on drug control espouses a
commitment to maintaining health, welfare and public safety, a
commitment that arguably provides undergirding for all of the nation’s
drug legislation, regulations, rules, and ordinances. 116
The
implementation of our nation’s drug policy, however, is realized
almost exclusively through prohibitive measures and the application
of severe punishment touted as the best means of eliminating drug
availability and deterring people from drug consumption through fear
of punishment. The upshot is that the entirety of our national drug
policy, supposedly aimed at protecting both individuals and society at
large from drugs and drug-related harm, is based on the myth that
these aims can be achieved through police enforcement. Almost fifty
years of practice reveals a different story, but these lessons are not
affecting a reduction in the allocation of resources—both capital and
human—budgeted for drug control. Below is an overview of some of
the costs and consequences of America’s war on drugs.

INCARCERATION
The United States has the highest incarceration rate per capita
of any country on the planet. 117 Our numbers dwarf those of nearly
every developed country, including those of highly repressive regimes,
such as Russia, China, and Iran. 118 America’s war on drugs is the
driving force of these astounding numbers of mass incarcerations over
the last four decades, the single largest contributor to new prison
The commitment of the United States is not unlike that adopted by the
United Nations. In the preamble of the 1961 United Nations Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, “the health and welfare of mankind” is the
described impetus for the UN drug policies. UNITED NATIONS, SINGLE
CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS, 1961, 1 (1961), available at
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1961_en.pdf.
117 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 6 (rev. ed. 2012).
118 Id.
116
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admissions being drug law violations. 119 The mechanics of these
swelling incarceration rates consist of increased numbers of
convictions in relation to arrests and increases in average sentence
lengths, both influenced by the nation’s drug enforcement policies. 120
The Brookings Institution reported that in sixteen years, between 1993
and 2009, thirty million people were arrested on drug charges. 121 Of
those arrested, more than three million received convictions with
accompanying prison sentences resulting in prison admissions. 122 In
fact, each year during the sixteen-year study period, more people were
admitted to prison for drug law violations than for violent crimes. 123
Considering the last 25 years, the number of federal prisoners
serving time for drug-related offenses has risen by nearly 2,000%, from
approximately 5,000 inmates in 1980 to over 95,000 in 2015. 124 When
state prisons and local jail populations are added to the federal
numbers, our nation’s incarcerated swell from approximately 320,000

DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, THE DRUG WAR, MASS INCARCERATION AND RACE
1 (2016),
http://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/DPA%20Fact%20Sheet_Dr
ug%20War%20Mass%20Incarceration%20and%20Race_%28Feb.%202016%29
.pdf. (last visited X)
120 There are a variety of contributing causes to the explosion in incarceration
rates, but regardless of the dynamics that have led to the increase, growing
numbers of non-drug related offenses are not part of the equation. In fact,
the number of non-drug related convictions has remained relatively
constant, if not in a state of decline. The multiplier is a rise in numbers of
convicted drug offenders coupled with longer sentences. Criminal justice
policies, not changes in underlying crime, account for nearly all of the
growth in our nation’s incarcerated population in recent decades. Practices
of law enforcement, prosecutors and the court systems are also contributors
to the growth of America’s prisons. See, e.g., STEVEN RAPHAEL & MICHAEL A.
STOLL, WHY ARE SO MANY AMERICANS IN PRISON? (2013). NOT CLEAR IF THIS
LAST ONE IS A BOOK ETC.
121 Jonathan Rothwell, Drug Offenders in American Prisons: The Critical
Distinction Between Stock and Flow, Brookings Institution (2015),
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/social-mobilitymemos/posts/2015/11/25-drug-offfenders-stock-flow-prisons-rothwell.
(last visited X)
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in 1980 to over 2.2 million today. 125 Individuals incarcerated for drug
offenses increased more than ten-fold during this same time period. 126
Related to these statistics is an even more dramatic growth in
the numbers of inmates not convicted of a crime and being housed in
local jails. Increases in convictions and increases in bail amounts have
contributed significantly to the rise in the number of individuals
detained in local jails awaiting conviction. Between 1983 and 2014, the
proportion of convicted inmates at the local level grew by 90 percent,
but the numbers of jail inmates not convicted of a crime escalated by
more than 200 percent. 127 Although data indicates that bail may be
assigned more often than it was two decades ago, the bail amounts
have increased pursuant to statutory amendments making it less
financially feasible for defendants to secure bail. For instance, in 1990,
large U.S. counties assigned bail to 53 percent of their felony
defendants, and in 2009, 72 percent of these defendants were assigned
bail. 128 Because of limited resources, a higher percentage of the accused
have been unable to finance bail and must remain incarcerated in local
jails while awaiting conviction.
Additionally, between 1980 and 2011, the average length of
prison sentences for federal drug offenses rose by 36 percent. 129 This is
an increase in prison time from approximately fifty-five months to
seventy-four months. 130 During the same period, the average prison
sentence for all other federal offenders declined. 131 Contributing to the
higher numbers of incarcerated drug offenders is the disappearance of
probation as a sanction for those convicted. In 1980, 26 percent of those
convicted of drug violations received probation. 132 By 2014, judges

THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FACT SHEET: TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS
(2016), http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trendsin-US-Corrections.pdf. (last visited X)
126 Id.
127 Bureau of Justice Statistics. 1990-2009. Felony Defendants in Large
Counties, Department of Justice. – How can you find this? Not clear from
cite.
128 Id.
129 THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, FEDERAL DRUG SENTENCING LAWS BRING
HIGH COST, LOW RETURN (2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/researchand-analysis/issue-briefs/2015/08/federal-drug-sentencing-laws-bringhigh-cost-low-return. (last visited X)
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
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were sending nearly all those convicted of drug offenses to prison,
reducing the numbers receiving probation to only 6 percent. 133
Vast numbers of drug convictions, longer sentences for those
convicted, and greater numbers of accused being housed in local jails
combine to effect ballooning incarceration costs. In the federal system
alone, one out of every four dollars spent by the U.S. Department of
Justice, more than $6.7 billion per year, is expended on housing federal
convicts. 134 Maintaining state prisons and jails demands an additional
$80 billion, an 89 percent increase since 1988. 135 When considering the
economic costs of America’s “war on drugs,” costs associated with
incarcerating those convicted occupy a single line item among the legal
institutional costs in the pursuit of a drug-free nation.

DRUG USE
According to 2014 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, an
estimated 27 million Americans aged twelve or older were current
illicit drug users, indicating that they had used an illegal drug during
the month prior to the interview. 136 This means that approximately one
out of every ten Americans in 2014 was a current illegal drug user.
These numbers are higher than those in every year since 2002. 137 The
National Institute on Drug Abuse reports that cocaine use among

Id.
THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM SHOWS DRAMATIC
LONG-TERM GROWTH (2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org//media/Assets/2015/02/Pew_FederalPrison_Growth.pdf. (last visited X)
135 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, STATE AND LOCAL EXPENDITURES ON
CORRECTIONS AND EDUCATION (2016),
https://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/other/expenditures-correctionseducation/brief.pdf. (last visited X)
136 SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,
BEHAVIORAL HEALTH TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2014
NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH 4 (2015),
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-FRR12014/NSDUH-FRR1-2014.pdf. (last visited X) The National Survey on Drug
Use and Health is in annual survey civilian, nine institutionalized population
of the United States aged 12 years old or older. It includes residents of
households and individuals in non-institutional groups, but excludes
homeless, active military personnel, and residents of jails, prisons, nursing
homes, mental institutions, and long-term hospitals.
137 Id. at 5.
133
134

145

146

4 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2017)

college-aged adults has risen sharply, 138 and according to the World
Drug Report, heroin use in the United States is up 145 percent. 139
Trafficking numbers in the United Nations’ report are based in part on
drug seizures. The research reports that heroin and morphine seizures
grew from an average of four tons per year from 1998 to 2008, to an
average of seven tons per year between 2009 and 2014. 140

OVERDOSE DEATHS
For the last fifteen years, deaths related to drug overdose have
been on a steep rise, 141 nearly tripling between 1999 and 2014. 142 After
recording alarming increases in drug overdoses, the Centers for
Disease Control (CDC) undertook an examination of overdose deaths
in the United States occurring between 2010 and 2015. 143 The drug
overdose death rate in 2010 was 38,329, representing 12.3 deaths per
100,000 people. 144 Five years later, overdose death rates increased to
52,404, or 16.3 deaths per 100,000 people, a 37 percent increase. 145 From
2014 to 2015, deaths resulting from drug overdose increased by 5,349
138 National Institute on Drug Abuse, Drug and Alcohol Use in College-Age
Adults, 2015 MONITORING THE FUTURE (2016),
https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trendsstatistics/infographics/drug-alcohol-use-in-college-age-adults-in-2015. (last
visited X)
139 UNITED NATIONS, WORLD DRUG REPORT 4 (2016), available at
http://www.unodc.org/doc/wdr2016/WORLD_DRUG_REPORT_2016_we
b.pdf.
140 Id. at xiii.
141 Press Release, Opioids Drive Continued Increase in Drug Overdose
Deaths, Centers for Disease Control (February 20, 2013),
https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2013/p0220_drug_overdose_deaths.
html. (last visited X)
142 Rose A. Rudd, Puja Seth, Felicita David, & Lawrence Scholl, Increases in
Drug and Opioid-Involved Overdose Deaths – United States, 2010-2015, Centers
for Disease Control, 65 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 1445,
1446 (2016), available at
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/wr/mm655051e1.htm.
143 Id. The CDC report includes drug overdose deaths recorded by the
National Vital Statistics System multiple cause-of-death mortality files..; see
also, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/mortality_public_use_data.htm. (last
visited X)
144 CDC , supra note 140.
145 Id. at 1446.
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persons or 11.4 percent, continuing the rising trend that began in
1999. 146
CDC researchers suggest that heroin and synthetic opioids
(other than methadone) are responsible for the rapid increase in
overdose deaths. 147 They report a frightening increase from 2014 to
2015 in the number of deaths caused from overdoses of synthetic
opioids (including fentanyl), a staggering 72 percent surge in the death
rate in a single year. 148 Heroin overdoses leading to death increased by
nearly 21 percent for the same time period. 149 Combining the deaths as
a result of overdoses of synthetic opioids and heroin, researchers found
increases across all demographic groups, all regions and in twentyeight states. At least one study reports that illicitly manufactured
fentanyl is responsible for some portion of these increased deaths. 150
The increases are consequences, as unintended as they may be,
of failing drug policies and enforcement approaches focused on
punishing offenders. The CDC warns of an
urgent need for a multifaceted, collaborative public
health and law enforcement approach to the opioid
epidemic, including implementing the CDC Guideline
for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain; improving
access to and use of prescription drug monitoring
programs; expanding naloxone distribution; enhancing
opioid use disorder treatment capacity and linkage into
treatment, including medication-assisted treatment;
implement and harm reduction approaches, such as
during services program; and supporting law
enforcement strategies to reduce the illicit opioid
supply. 151
Rose A. Rudd, Noah Aleshire, Jon E. Zibbell, & R. Matthew Gladden,
Increases in Drug and Opioid Overdose Deaths – United States, 200-2014, Centers
for Disease Control, 64 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 1378
(2016), available at
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6450a3.htm.
147 CDC, supra note 141.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 R. Matthew Gladden, P Martinez, P Seth, Fentanyl Law Enforcement
Submission and Increases in Synthetic Opioid-involved Overdose Deaths – 27
States, 2013-2014, Centers for Disease Control, 65 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WEEKLY REPORT 837 (2016), available at
http://dxdoi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6533a2.
151 CDC, supra note 141.
146

147

148

4 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2017)

CONSTITUTIONAL COSTS
The War on Drugs raises constitutional alarms dating back to
the passage of the Harrison Act. Since adoption of our nation’s drug
control strategies, much of the enforcement of the drug policies and the
effort to eradicate drug use have come with substantial costs extending
far beyond monetary expenditures.
There are real questions
concerning the constitutionality of many of the drug control efforts and
the high cost exerted on the Bill of Rights. Legal evolutions of
mandatory minimum sentences, drug courts, drug testing in schools,
and no-knock warrants arguably in violation of the eighth, sixth, fifth
and fourth amendments, respectively, are taking their toll, shrinking
civil rights and civil liberties, and threatening the freedoms associated
with American democracy.
Because the drug industry arises from the voluntary
transactions of tens of millions of people—all of whom
try to keep their actions secret—the aggressive law
enforcement schemes that constitute the war must aim
at penetrating the private lives of those millions. And
because nearly anyone may be a drug user or seller of
drugs or an aider and abettor of the drug industry,
virtually everyone has become a suspect. All must be
observed, checked screened, tested, and admonished –
the guilty and innocent alike. 152
As Professor Wisotsky points out, there is tragic irony in the fact that
“while the War on Drugs has failed completely to halt the influx of
cocaine and heroin, both of which are cheaper, purer, and more
abundant than ever,” 153 America’s drug strategy and crackdown
efforts have systematically curtailed the liberty and privacy of
Americans. The law related to search and seizure provides just one
example of how our civil rights and civil liberties have become yet
another consequence of America’s war on drugs.
STEVEN WISOTSKY, CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 180: A SOCIETY OF
SUSPECTS: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1992),
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/society-suspects-wardrugs-civil-liberties. (last visited X)
153 Id.
152
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SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Most recently, the U.S. Supreme Court eroded the exclusionary
rule in historic proportions, all but erasing it, upholding the
admissibility of evidence seized during an admittedly unlawful stop
by police. 154 The Court’s holding is simply the latest in a long list of
decisions evidencing a slide toward the “anything-goes-in-the-War-onDrugs attitude.” 155 During the Reagan years, the Court usually upheld
the government’s exercise of power when the power was exercised in
the fight against drugs, notwithstanding constitutional challenges, but
the trend in judicial decisions was not limited to the Reagan
administration and has continued long after President Reagan left
office. We see this trend as the Court failed to find objectionable drug
agents’ use of a drug courier profile to stop, detain, and question
people without a warrant and without probable cause; 156 to subject a
traveler’s luggage to a sniffing examination by a drug-detection canine
without a warrant and without probable cause; 157 to search a public
school student’s purse without a warrant and without probable
cause; 158 and to search ships in inland waterways at will. 159
Homes, too, began to fall to the government’s power as the drug
war escalated. The right to privacy Americans enjoyed in their
residences experienced serious restriction. The Supreme Court
approved the use of search warrants for residences obtained on the
basis of an anonymous tip alone. 160 It also upheld the use of illegally
seized evidence under a “good faith exception” to the exclusionary

154 See, Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016). In addition to protection from
unlawful search and seizure, the exclusionary rule is also designed to
provide a remedy, short of criminal prosecution, in response to prosecutors
and police who illegally gather evidence in violation of the Bill of Rights.
155 See, Wisotsky, supra note 151.
156 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983); see also, United States v.
Montoya, 473 U.S. 531 (1985); and Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5 (1984).

United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 606, 706 (1983).
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1985).
159 United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 US. 579, 593 (1983).
160 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
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rule; 161 the right of law enforcement to make a warrantless search while
trespassing in “open fields” that were surrounded by fencing and
posted with “No Trespassing” signs; 162 the right of the police to
conduct a warrantless search of a barn adjacent to a residence; 163 law
enforcement’s ability to conduct a warrantless search of a motor home
occupied as a residence; 164 the power to conduct a warrantless search
of a home on the consent of an occasional visitor lacking legal authority
over the premises; 165 and the ability of law enforcement to conduct a
“knock-and-announce” procedure allowing less than five seconds
before entry. 166 Relatedly, the Court approved the warrantless aerial
surveillance over private property. 167
The Court also significantly expanded the powers of police to
stop, question, and detain drivers of vehicles on suspicion with less
than probable cause, 168 or with no suspicion at all at fixed checkpoints
or roadblocks; 169 to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles and
closed containers situated within the vehicles; 170 and to conduct
surveillance of suspects by placing transmitters or beepers on vehicles
or in containers therein. 171 In another erosive decision, the Court
reversed the Florida Supreme Court in upholding the constitutionality
of the interrogation of a Greyhound bus passenger and the search of
his baggage by armed officers within the confines of the bus. 172

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905 (1984). The Court applied the rule
to the search of a home made pursuant to a defective warrant issued without
probable cause. Id. See also, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
162 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
163 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
164 California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985).
165 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
166 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
161

California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); see also, Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S.
445 (1989) (allowing aerial surveillance by fixed-wing aircraft at an altitude
of 1,000 feet and by helicopter at 400 feet).
168 United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
169 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983); Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
170 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
171 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983); United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705, 721 (1984).
172 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
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UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
Mass incarceration and hyper-criminalization are a catalyst for
poverty in America. Convicted felons are substantially more likely to
face challenging circumstances attempting to re-integrate into society
following their release from incarceration.
The history of
imprisonment and their accompanying criminal record impedes
success in the labor market – employment limitations and depressed
wages severely restrict a convicted individual’s abilities to attain selfsufficiency. A person’s criminal conviction negatively impacts him far
beyond imprisonment and its associated loss of freedoms. Criminal
sanctions affect the felon’s health, debt situation, transportation
options, housing opportunities, nutrition and security. 173 They also
produce adverse consequences for children and contribute to financial
and emotional stresses that undermine marriages and familial
relationships. 174 At the community level, criminal sanctions promote
inequality and often deteriorate citizens’ trust in the government.
Convictions create criminal records that can present significant
barriers to employment, housing, public assistance, education, family
reunification, developing good credit and more. 175 Even a minor
criminal record, such as a misdemeanor or arrest without conviction,
constructs potential barriers that can prevent an individual’s successful
acclamation in society. 176

See, Economic Perspectives on Incarceration and the Criminal Justice
System 45 (2016). – How can you find this? Seems to need a little more in the
cite.
174 Id.
175 The Sentencing Project, Americans with Criminal Records, HALF IN TEN 1
http://www.sentencingproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/Americans-with-Criminal-Records-Poverty-andOpportunity-Profile.pdf. (last visited X) In one experiment, researchers
randomly assigned a criminal record to otherwise identical job applicants
finding that those with criminal records were 50 percent less likely to receive
an invitation to interview or job offer; percentages for blacks was even
higher. Devah Pager, Bruce Western, & Naomi Sugie, Sequencing
Disadvantage: Barriers to Employment Facing Young Black and White Men with
Criminal Records, 623 THE ANNALS OF THE ACAD. OF POLITICAL AND SOC.
SCIENCE 195-213 (2009); Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108
AMERICAN J. OF SOCIOLOGY 937-975 (2003).
176 Id. An examination of individual earnings before and after arrest suggests
that even arrests without conviction can decrease earning and employment.
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As of July 1, 2015, more than seventy million Americans,
roughly a third of the nation’s adult population, possessed some type
of criminal record. 177 By way of comparison, this number is greater
than the entire U.S. population in 1900; approximately equal to the
number of Americans holding college diplomas; and if criminal record
holders were a separate nation, they would comprise the eighteenth
largest country on Earth (larger than France and Canada and three
times larger than Australia). 178
To further exacerbate the issues for criminal record holders,
recent surveys indicate that more than 70 percent of American
employers conduct criminal background checks as a prerequisite for
employment. 179 The costs of possessing a criminal record include
severely limited employment options. Additionally, individuals with
criminal records are often barred from obtaining occupational licenses
that would assist them not only with employment opportunities, but
also enhance their prospects for improving their socio-economic status.
The American Bar Association estimates that there are over 1,000
mandatory license exclusions for individuals with minor records,
which may include misdemeanor convictions or arrests without
conviction, and nearly 3,000 exclusions for those with felony records. 180
The incarcerated population is comprised largely of individuals
who, even pre-conviction, are disproportionately poor and experience
lower education levels. 181 As few as 10 percent of these individuals
Jeffrey Grogge, The Effect of Arrests on the Employment and Earnings of Young
Men, 110 THE QUARTERLY J. OF ECONOMICS 51-71 (1995).
177 Matthew Friedman, Just Facts: As Many Americans Have Criminal Records
as College Diplomas, Breannan Center for Justice (2015),
https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/just-facts-many-americans-havecriminal-records-college-diplomas. (last visited X)
178 Id.
179 Harry J. Holzer, Steven Raphael, & Michael A. Stoll, Perceived Criminality,
Criminal Background Checks, and the Racial Hiring Practices of Employers, 49 J. OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS 451, 452 (2006).
180 American Bar Association, National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of
Conviction, http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/search/. (last visited
X)
181 See, Jeffrey R. Kling, Incarceration Length, Employment, and Earnings 494
(Princeton Univ. – Industrial Relations Section, Working Paper, 2006) – How
can we find this as a working paper? Just checking the cite.; see also, Doris J.
James & Lauren E. Glaze, Mental Health Problems of Prison and Jail Inmates,
Bureau of Justice Statistics Report (2006); and William J. Sabol, Local Labor
market Conditions and Post-prison Employment: Evidence from Ohio (Bureau of
Justice, Working Paper 2007).
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have positive pre-incarceration earnings. 182
The period of
incarceration further reduces any earnings and places additional
strains on families already experiencing a shortage of resources. One
study indicates the incarceration of a father increases by 38 percent the
probability that a family’s economic status will decline to or remain at
poverty level. 183
Incarceration impacts health, posing health risks during
imprisonment and increasing the likelihood of health risks postconfinement. Prisons at maximum capacity or, worse, at greater than
maximum capacity, amplify the risks of the incarcerated magnifying
the possibility of inmate injury, sexual victimization, disease
transmission, and even death. Overcrowded prisons forced to reduce
their inmate population witnessed a reduction of six inmate deaths per
year. 184 Additionally, incidents of sexual assault are higher among the
incarcerated than the general population. 185
Criminal convictions also impact housing, not only for an
individual, but potentially for his family as well. The U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) does not unilaterally bar
individuals with criminal records from residing in public housing, but
it does allow each local Public Housing Authority (PHA) the latitude
to establish its own practice concerning criminal record policies. More
often than not the restrictions of the PHAs are greater than the federal
departmental guidelines, preventing individuals with a criminal
history from qualifying for housing. Even low-level, nonviolent
offenders, like those convicted of alcohol and drug-related crimes, are

Id.
Rucker Johnson, Ever-increasing Levels of Parental Incarceration and the
Consequences for Children, DO PRISONS MAKE US SAFER?: THE BENEFITS AND
COSTS OF THE PRISON BOOM 177-206 (Steven Rafael & Michael A. Stoll eds.,
2009).
184 Richard T. Boylan & Naci Mocan, Intended and Unintended Consequences of
Prison Reform, 30 J. OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 558-586 (2013).
185 Reports chronicle 3.7 percent of incarcerated men experience sexual abuse,
as compared to 8.5 percent of incarcerated women. Allen J. Beck, Marcus
Berzofsky, Rachel Caspar, & Christopher Krebs, Sexual Victimization in
Prisons and Jails Reported by Inmates, 2011-12, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S.
Department of Justice (2013). Where can we find this document? Seems the
cite needs a little more information.
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included in the PHAs prohibitions, making them ineligible for public
housing assistance. 186
There are other government assistance programs moved
beyond the reach of individuals convicted of crimes. Federal safety net
programs, such as Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP) and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) have
restricted access to those with criminal records. Many states have
overridden federal restrictions to provide access to convicted felons,
unless an individual received a felony drug conviction. 187 Thirty states
deny SNAP benefits to convicted drug felons and thirty-six states deny
them access to TANF. 188
Beyond the ramifications related to housing and federal
assistance programs, parental incarceration negatively impacts
children. More than five million children have at least one parent who
is currently or has been imprisoned. 189 The demographics of
incarcerated parents indicate that 1 percent of white children have an
incarcerated parent, 7 to 9 percent of black children, and 2 percent of
Hispanic children. 190 Further, individuals convicted of non-violent
drug offenses are 20 percent more likely to be parents than those
persons serving time for violent or property crimes. 191
For the children, parental incarceration becomes a prominent
risk factor for a number of adverse outcomes that include antisocial and
violent behavior, mental health problems, school dropout, and
unemployment. 192 Boys as young as five years old who had one or
Marah A. Curtis, Sarah Garlington, & Lisa S. Schottenfeld, Alcohol, Drug,
and Criminal History Restrictions in Public Housing, 15 CITYSCAPE: A J. OF POL.
DEV. AND RES. 37-52 (2013).
187 Rebecca Beitch, States Rethink Restrictions on Food Stamps, Welfare for Drug
Felons, The Pew Charitable Trusts (2015),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2015/07/30/states-rethink-restrictions-on-foodstamps-welfare-for-drug-felons. (last visited X)
188 Id.
189 David Murphrey & P. Mae Cooper, Parents Behind Bars: What Happens to
Their Children?, CHILD TRENDS (2015).
190 Lauren E. Glaze & Laura M. Maruschak, Parents in Prison and Their Minor
Children, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, U. S. Department of
Justice (2010), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pptmc.pdf. (last
visited X)
191 Id.
192 Joseph Murray and David P. Farrington, The Effects of Parental
Imprisonment on Children, 37 CRIME AND JUSTICE 133, 133-206 (2008). The
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more parents in prison exhibited higher levels of physical
aggression. 193 Equally disconcerting is a Swedish study reporting
children of incarcerated fathers are more likely to be convicted of a
crime and subsequently incarcerated, continuing perpetual
incarceration throughout generations. 194

V. CONCLUSION
It is all but impossible to portray a true picture of the costs and
consequences of America’s war on drugs without a complete
assessment, and no complete study of the subject has yet to be
undertaken. Certainly, aspects of the costs have been covered over
time, but a comprehensive undertaking of the easily quantifiable costs
alongside the more subjective consequences warrants attention.
Nevertheless, despite the lack of an accurate accounting of the full costs
and consequences, there is little doubt that the government attention,
human capital, fiscal outlay, constitutional erosions, and hosts of
unintended consequences suffered by those convicted and their
families present a bill too large for Americans to pay. The
unquestionable lack of any measurable success demands significant
and expedient reform, and the longer reform is delayed, the greater the
costs that will be extracted.

National Task Force on Children Exposed to Violence found parental arrest
and incarceration were among the traumatic events that increase the risk of
post-traumatic stress disorder in children. ROBERT L. LISTENBEE, REPORT OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON CHILDREN EXPOSED TO
VIOLENCE, U.S. Department of Justice (2012), available at
https://www.justice.gov/defendingchildhood/cev-rpt-full.pdf.
193 Christopher Wildeman, Parental Incarceration and Children’s Physically
Aggressive Behaviors: Evidence from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing
Study, 89 SOCIAL FORCES 285, 285-309 (2010).
194 Randi Hjalmarsson & Matthew J. Lindquist, Like Godfather, Like Son:
Exploring the Intergenerational Nature of Crime, 47 J. OF HUMAN RESOURCES 550,
550-582 (2012).
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